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A B S T R A C T
This study explores strategic trade-offs between corporate tax behaviour and environmental performance dis-
closure, both important elements of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Tax finances public goods and reduces
investor wealth. Corporate strategies may balance such incompatible stakeholder interests through trade-offs
across CSR elements. In this empirical study of Norwegian companies, there are no indications of trade-offs
between corporate tax aggressiveness (TAG) and mandatory disclosure, in line with stick-to-the-rules/compliant
behaviour for both. However, the positive relationship between TAG and voluntary disclosure indicates that
strategic trade-offs exist and ensure an acceptable level of legitimacy from different stakeholders overall. Hence,
corporate strategies differ for mandatory and voluntary actions, in line with a multidimensional legitimacy risk
and legitimation strategy framework.
1. Introduction
There is an emerging debate of whether companies and stakeholders
make trade-offs across elements1 of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
(Dowling, 2014). Companies need legitimacy from multiple stakeholder
groups to survive (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Clarkson, 1995). Stakeholder
expectations may be incompatible both within and across elements of CSR
(Devinney, 2009).2 Strategic trade-offs across elements of CSR may enable
companies to meet at least some demands of stakeholder groups and
thereby ensure sufficient legitimacy overall. The purpose of this study is to
explore indications of trade-offs, or the relationship, between two im-
portant elements of CSR: corporate tax behaviour (CTB) and environmental
performance disclosure in a Norwegian setting. Knowledge of such strategic
considerations improves understanding of corporate behaviour and can
guide policy to ensure governmental objectives.
In Norway, the large aquaculture industry seems to provide promi-
nent examples of such trade-offs. Current fish-farming practices have
negative environmental impacts pertaining to biodiversity/fish escapes,
fish health/diseases/salmon louse, emissions, and more (Liu, Olaussen, &
Skonhoft, 2014; Olaussen, 2018). Negative media attention to these is-
sues poses a legitimacy risk. The industry has responded in several ways.
A crucial part of the legitimation strategies is to emphasise tax payments
to local communities and employment in rural areas as positive CSR
contributions (www.laks.no/laksenaringen, accessed 2019-01-30).
Aquaculture organisations have communicated these tax arguments over
many years through multiple channels, including extensive TV com-
mercials. Hence, the strategy of offsetting environmental challenges by
outlining contributions to communities through taxes is widely re-
cognized. The controlling owner of SalMar, the world’s fourth-largest
salmon producer, acknowledges environmental challenges, even though
they “work continuously to produce salmon with the least possible en-
vironmental impact”. He emphasises, “The most important CSR is to
contribute through tax payment” (Adresseavisen, 2017). The CEO of
Nova Sea, another fish-farming company, says in relation to environ-
mental criticism that “It is fisheries and in recent years fish-farming that
provide light in houses along the coast” (Adresseavisen, 2015, p. 20).
Politicians and newspaper editorials address the same issue: “The fish-
farming industry still has reputational challenges because of escapes and
diseases. If revenues from the new tax benefit local communities, it may
be more attractive for municipalities to open up for fish-farming. This
can limit the negative consequences of a new tax and provide more jobs
in the coastal municipalities” (Adresseavisen, 2018, p. 2).
Trade-offs are of particular interest for tax behaviour, which is the
latest element included in the CSR concept (Beloe, Lye, Cruickshank, &
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Murphy, 2006; Christensen & Murphy, 2004). Society as a whole (ex-
ternal stakeholders) needs companies to pay their fair share of tax to
fund provision of public goods and welfare (Dowling, 2014), including
infrastructure vital for business (Stephenson & Vracheva, 2015). On the
other hand, the wealth of shareholders (residual claimants) could
benefit from corporate tax aggressiveness (TAG)—reduced tax payment
(Friedman, 1970; Hasseldine & Morris, 2013). Conflicting interests
among stakeholders necessitate strategic prioritisation: “Taxes are the
result of a firm’s strategy and decisions” (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012, p.
809). Companies affect TAG through choices concerning legal tax
planning, ethical questionable tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion.
Although it is hard to balance the tax interests of shareholders and
external stakeholders (incompatible expectations within a CSR ele-
ment), it may still be possible to manage legitimacy risks by addressing
(performance on) other CSR areas that tax-dissatisfied stakeholders find
attractive (trade-offs across CSR elements). CTB legitimacy risks con-
cerning external stakeholders (for example government and local
communities) result mainly from tax-aggressive behaviours—namely,
firms neglecting their societal obligation to pay a fair share of tax.
Highly tax-aggressive strategies and the decoupling of CTB and tax
disclosures are common, and tax avoidance and tax evasion cause en-
ormous amounts of lost government revenue (2012, Christensen &
Murphy, 2004; Dowling, 2014; Preuss, 2010; Sikka, 2010; Ylönen &
Laine, 2015). As such, there has been increasing attention towards is-
sues such as tax base erosion, profit shifting and tax havens from OECD,
governments, media (including the Panama- and Paradise-paper leaks),
Transparency International, Tax Justice Network and others.
Companies’ performance on other CSR elements, such as the en-
vironment, is also subject to strategic considerations (Adams & Whelan,
2009; Lindblom, 2010; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). What governments,
local communities and environmental NGOs perceive as desirable or
acceptable levels of environmental performance of corporate operations
and products may deviate from the optimal level for shareholders’
profitability objectives (Friedman, 1970). The societal awareness/im-
portance of environmental issues has increased over time. Hence, trade-
offs to handle legitimacy risks associated with disclosure of environ-
mental status and performance may occur.3 For example, low TAG may
positively affect society’s perception of a company’s citizenship beha-
viour and offset legitimacy risks concerning questionable environ-
mental performance (e.g., the aquaculture example above).
Corporations have the strategic option of trying to trade off legiti-
macy risks concerning what some important stakeholder groups per-
ceive as bad CTB or environmental performance by highlighting what
they perceive as desirable/good performance on the other CSR element
(Dowling, 2014). Hence, the question is the degree to which such re-
lationships between tax and environmental (or other CSR elements)
performance exist more generally (and over time4) and their direction/
sign (how the trade-offs are used).
There is much literature on both CTB (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010)
and CSR (reporting) (Fifka, 2013) separately. With a few exceptions
(e.g., Crumbley, Epstein, & Bravenec, 1977), CTB has only been ex-
amined within a CSR context in the last few years (Stephenson &
Vracheva, 2015). The few extant studies focus mainly on the relation-
ship between CTB and an aggregated CSR concept.5 The results diverge
widely (Ylönen & Laine, 2015). There are calls for more research to
explore whether stable relationships exist and which determinants af-
fect them (Dowling, 2014; Fallan, 2015; Hoi, Wu, & Zhang, 2013;
Huseynov & Klamm, 2012; Laguir, Stagliano, & Elbaz, 2015; Lanis &
Richardson, 2012, 2013, 2015; Preuss, 2012; Sikka, 2010).
Laguir et al. (2015) and Landry, Deslandes, and Fortin (2013)
concluded that the mixed findings are caused (at least partly) by di-
verging relationships between CTB and different individual elements of
CSR. An aggregated CSR concept may dilute these relationships. The
current study takes this into account by concentrating on environ-
mental issues.
However, a current meta-analysis (presented later) shows that re-
sults even for individual CSR elements are ambiguous. It is necessary to
explore additional explanatory factors. All CSR elements have a
common feature: they consider the company’s citizenship behaviour
and are either mandatory or voluntary to adopt. In this study it is ar-
gued that corporate strategies differ for mandatory and voluntary ac-
tions. Theoretically, this is based on a novel use of legitimacy theory in
CSR studies. Legitimacy is a multidimensional concept that separates
regulatory legitimacy from other legitimacy dimensions for exactly this
reason (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). Empirically, differences between man-
datory and voluntary actions are revealed in studies on disclosure of
environmental performance (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Criado-Jiménez,
Fernández-Chulián, Husillos-Carqués, & Larrinaga-González, 2008;
Fallan, 2016; Larrinaga, Carrasco, Correa, Llena, & Moneva, 2002;
Mobus, 2005). The effect of mandatory versus voluntary actions is also
relevant in light of the international trend of increasing CSR/environ-
mental reporting regulation (Camilleri, 2015; Nyquist, 2003), illu-
strated by the recent changes in the EU’s accounting directive con-
cerning non-financial information (Johansen, 2016). Regulation versus
voluntarism is addressed in a large stream of accounting literature. It is
necessary to consider and separate mandatory and voluntary actions
when analysing the relationship between CTB and CSR elements
(Fallan, 2015).
The empirical objective of this study is to investigate the relation-
ships (trade-offs) between corporate tax behaviour and mandatory and
voluntary corporate environmental disclosures respectively. The study
includes publicly listed companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
within the jurisdiction of the Norwegian Tax Act and the Norwegian
Accounting Act. Data on environmental disclosure were manually col-
lected from the annual reports for 2009 based on content analysis. CTB
is analysed as the degree of TAG by two measures of (cash) effective tax
rates (ETR) for the years 2009, 2010 and 2012. The Norwegian setting
is well suited for this investigation because there is a high public
awareness of tax behaviour, environmental issues are an important part
of the public agenda, and relevant regulations have existed for a long
time.
One finding of this study is that a corporate stick-to-the-rules
strategy seems to affect tax payments and mandatory environmental
disclosure similarly, and no trade-offs are revealed. On the other hand,
the results reveal a trade-off between CTB and voluntary environmental
disclosure. High (low) TAG seems to be associated with a high (low)
degree of voluntary environmental disclosure. Furthermore, the re-
lationship between CTB and corporate environmental disclosure is di-
luted if mandatory and voluntary disclosures are aggregated into one
concept of total environmental disclosure. This may explain the mixed
findings in extant studies.
The authors have not identified any extant, published study that has
(explicitly) analysed the relationship between CTB and mandatory CSR
disclosure. This study is the first to explore whether possible trade-offs
between CTB and environmental disclosure are related differently to
mandatory or voluntary performance information, as called for by
Fallan (2015). The revealed difference between mandatory and volun-
tary actions when it comes to corporate use of strategic trade-offs
among CSR elements is relevant for well-informed use of corporate
environmental disclosure and may have policy implications: knowledge
that regulation (and probably enforcement) affects corporate strategic
3 The legitimacy risks associated with disclosure include what environmental
status and performance the company claims. Volkswagen’s claim of “clean
diesel” cars is one example of legitimacy costs when disclosure is false. Actual
environmental status and performance might not be consistent with what the
firm discloses. Hence, this study focuses on disclosure and what companies
claim to be their environmental status or performance.
4 We do not investigate how this relationship changes over time in the current
study.
5 All other elements of CSR are measured together as one concept/in one
variable.
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behaviour is important for governments that need to protect the tax
base and improve environmental status and performance disclosure.
The need for separation of mandatory and voluntary actions/disclosure
elements (characteristics within individual CSR elements) extends the
conclusion of Laguir et al. (2015) and Landry et al. (2013) concerning
separation of analysis between individual CSR elements. Another novel
feature in the study is the use of the multidimensional legitimacy fra-
mework together with Lindblom’s (2010) four legitimation strategies
for hypothesis development.
2. Taxes as CSR concept
The question of whether tax payments/contributions are an element
of CSR fits into the same discussion as whether there is such a thing as
CSR (Carroll, 1991; Friedman, 1970). Tax as a CSR concept is one of the
most addressed questions in the emerging literature (Ylönen & Laine,
2015).
Friedman (1970) argued that “the social responsibility of business is
to increase its profits”. Companies should engage in “CSR activities”
only to the extent they increase profits. Because such measures are
taken on the basis of self-interest, there is no such thing as CSR. This
perspective only considers the interests of owners/shareholders. Tax is
regarded as a cost for the firm that may reduce the contribution to
residual claimants (shareholders) and affect investment decisions
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a). High TAG is perceived as positive and ne-
cessary, ceteris paribus. Still, in real situations, TAG is a cost-benefit
consideration for rational decision makers (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
Dowling, 2014; Erle, Hickey, Doherty, & Flexman, 2004; Friedman,
1970). The benefits are expected financial tax savings, and the potential
costs consist of, e.g., expected reputational/legitimacy losses (including
potential demand effects), penalties due to violations of the tax law and
risks concerning future changes in regulation and enforcement. Extant
studies indicate that perceived reputational/legitimacy effects are sig-
nificant, but also that stock market effects are conditional, situational or
uncertain (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, & Shroff, 2014; Hanlon &
Slemrod, 2009). Profit maximisation is also restricted by the “basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom” (Friedman, 1970). Hence, companies/corporate man-
agement face economic, legal and ethical responsibilities. This in-
directly recognises other stakeholders than owners as well, and is
bridging neoclassical economic views and CSR perspectives.
Proponents of CSR argue that while economic performance is a basic
building block, companies also face legal, ethical and philanthropic
responsibilities: the CSR pyramid (Carroll, 1991). A company must
consider the various and conflicting interests of many stakeholder
groups, and not only those of shareholders (Bansal & Roth, 2000;
Clarkson, 1995), to ensure organisational legitimacy and survival
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Lindblom, 2010; Suchman, 1995). The CSR
pyramid concerns all elements of CSR, such as environmental issues,
human resources, community involvement, human rights, corporate
governance, tax payment and other business behaviour (Laguir et al.,
2015). In terms of tax, society as a whole (people, local communities,
government etc.) needs companies to pay taxes (Dowling, 2014). High
TAG (i.e., when firms neglect their social obligation to pay a fair share
of tax) may cause legitimacy risks for the company. In CSR (reporting)
research, legitimacy theory is the most used and allegedly the pre-
eminent explanatory theory (Campbell, Craven, & Shrives, 2003;
Vourvachis & Woodward, 2015). The associated legitimacy risks consist
of regulatory, moral, cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy risks (Aldrich
& Ruef, 2006; Fallan, 2016; Suchman, 1995). According to Aldrich and
Ruef (2006), p. 186), regulatory legitimacy pertains to “conformity
with governmental rules and regulations”, whereas moral legitimacy
reflects assessments of “conformity with cultural norms and values”, i.e.
whether something is the right thing to do (Suchman, 1995). Cognitive
legitimacy describes the degree to which a phenomenon is accepted by
a society (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Suchman, 1995), where the highest
form is taken-for-grantedness. Pragmatic legitimacy refers to how an
organisation affects stakeholders’ self-interests, unlike the altruistic
perspective of moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Self-interest may
differ among stakeholder groups.6
The responsibility of businesses regarding tax payment is not trivial
(Christensen & Murphy, 2004; Dowling, 2014; Freedman, 2004;
Hasseldine & Morris, 2013; Kuznetsov, Kuznetsova, & Warren, 2009;
Sikka, 2010, 2013; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). Perceptions of the meaning
of “paying a fair share of tax” differ among stakeholders. It is a question
of resource allocation that also includes legal and ethical perspectives.
High TAG benefits and, hence, secures pragmatic legitimacy from
owners. At the other end of TAG, paying more tax than the law requires
(very low TAG) is not necessarily more socially responsible (Dowling,
2014; Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, & Shevlin, 2002; Ylönen &
Laine, 2015), but low TAG reduces pragmatic (from stakeholders such
as government), regulatory and possibly other legitimacy risks. Con-
flicting views on the boundaries of responsible CTB also materialise in
varying interpretations of legal and ethical consequences of law re-
quirements: according to the CSR perspective, companies may be ex-
pected to abide by both the letter and spirit of the law (Dowling, 2014).
Societies cannot—and do not want to—regulate all affairs through
legislation. Additionally, everybody has ethical responsibility as part of
society irrespective of whether they act as people or organisations
(Ravnaas, 1986). This discussion recognises a corporate managerial
latitude between mandatory and voluntary actions.
The concept of CSR has become widely accepted in theory, research
studies, and in corporate talk/reporting (Fifka, 2013; Vourvachis &
Woodward, 2015). CTB has recently become a part of the CSR concept/
operationalisation in research studies (Beloe et al., 2006; Christensen &
Murphy, 2004; Stephenson & Vracheva, 2015). A majority of large,
listed companies on major stock exchanges disclose tax information in
their CSR reports (Hardeck, 2012).7 Issues such as corporate citizen-
ship, public goods, welfare, democracy and civilisation establish CTB as
a relevant and central part of CSR (Avi-Yonah, 2009; Bird & Davis-
Nozemack, 2018; Christensen & Murphy, 2004; Dowling, 2014; Preuss,
2012; Sikka, 2010; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). This also means that taxes as
a CSR concept is best illustrated through trade-offs. Governments’ tax
revenues are imperative for well-functioning societies (Bird & Davis-
Nozemack, 2018; Christensen & Murphy, 2004). At the same time,
companies’ contribution to their residual claimants (shareholders) and
the market value of companies may increase by tax minimisation/high
TAG. Such CTB, economic free riding, is without consequence for in-
dividual companies’ use of public goods (Christensen & Murphy, 2004).
Still, legitimacy is crucial for the companies’ survival (Suchman, 1995).
If tax payment is perceived as important for corporate citizenship/CSR,
economic free riding may be perceived negatively by other stakeholders
and pose (pragmatic and other) legitimacy risks. Tax’s importance, the
conflicts of interest concerning it, and the fact that CTB and other CSR
performance (disclosure) to a large extent are strategic corporate de-
cisions (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000), clearly
establish tax as a CSR. This also emphasises the relevance of studies on
the potential relationship and trade-offs between CTB and other ele-
ments of CSR.
Dowling (2014) raises the question of whether such trade-offs exist,
i.e., whether companies make them and stakeholders accept them.8
Trade-offs and cost-benefit assessments are relevant under the CSR
6 Friedman’s view is a special case in which the interests of owners are
paramount.
7 This does not necessarily mean that they see CTB as a moral issue (Dowling,
2014).
8 It should be noted that the need for such trade-offs (i.e., their strategic
importance) is probably closely linked to the perceived significance of CSR
legitimacy risks—the importance of tax payments and other CSR issues, re-
spectively.
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perspective to balance incompatible issues between and within all four
levels of the CSR pyramid as well as the different elements of CSR and
stakeholder groups with heterogeneous objectives. It reduces legiti-
macy risks. Trade-offs are also a basic feature of Friedman’s perspective.
The level of CSR performance (disclosure) should be optimised solely to
maximise the company’s market value/shareholders’ wealth (a prag-
matic legitimacy approach). This requires corporate management to
engage in strategic cost-benefit considerations (Adams & Whelan, 2009;
Vuontisjörvi, 2013). If CTB affects the value of the company, that is an
indication that perceived socially questionable or irresponsible perfor-
mance on one element of CSR can be outweighed by good CSR per-
formance on another. All in all, regardless of CSR or Friedman per-
spectives, companies should make trade-offs across elements of CSR
(and stakeholder interests) to ensure sufficient legitimacy. Empirically,
the existence of trade-offs is indicated by a positive relationship be-
tween TAG and the relevant CSR element(s).
3. Previous research on the CTB–environmental CSR relationship
During the last few years, studies on the CTB–CSR relationship have
emerged. Most of these studies examine the relationship between TAG
and an aggregated CSR concept. The overall results are ambiguous, as
shown in Table 1. Some studies find a positive relationship in line with
trade-offs across elements of CSR (e.g., Lanis & Richardson, 2013),
others find no unique relationship or mixed results (e.g., Landry et al.,
2013), while some indicate that corporations with high CSR perfor-
mance are less tax aggressive (e.g., Lanis & Richardson, 2012, 2015;
Muller & Kolk, 2015). To explore whether stable relationships exist, or
to explain mixed findings, mediating factors such as earnings perfor-
mance (Watson, 2015), tax fees (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012) and own-
ership structure and internationalisation (Landry et al., 2013; Muller
and Kolk, 2015; Sträter, 2016) have been suggested. Results differ be-
tween and within studies, even for studies of similar companies within
one country (Lanis & Richardson, 2012, 2013).
CSR is a broad and heterogeneous concept. Corporate performance
and legitimacy risks are likely to differ among CSR elements, and ag-
gregation may randomly offset/dilute diverging relationships.
Empirically, the direction and significance of the relationship between
CTB and several individual CSR elements differ among the CSR elements
within all identified studies that analyse this (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012;
Laguir et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2013; Lanis & Richardson, 2012, 2015;
Preuss, 2010, 2012). Therefore, a state-of-the-art mediating factor in this
field is that CSR elements should be analysed separately, not aggregated
into one general CSR concept, when their interplay with CTB is explored
(Laguir et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2013).
Hence, this study addresses one specific CSR element’s relationship
with CTB: the natural environment, which is the most addressed ele-
ment in CSR research. Legitimacy risks and strategic behaviour is re-
levant in connection with environmental disasters such as Exxon Valdez
(Cho, 2009; Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2000; Patten, 1992; Walden &
Schwartz, 1997). In the fish-farming example above, legitimacy risks
and trade-offs between environmental and tax issues are openly re-
cognised by the industry itself, even in normal day-to-day operations.
Such situations may be common (De Villiers & van Staden, 2011).
Trade-offs occur both in situations with low TAG/poor environmental
performance (cf. fish farming9) and high TAG/good environmental
CSR.10 Indications of trade-offs are revealed by positive relationships in
Table 2. Laguir et al. (2015) found this in a quantitative study, while
Sikka (2010) and Ylönen and Laine (2015) explore cases from major
companies that have pledged to behave in an environmentally, ethically
or socially responsible way while indulging in heavily tax-aggressive
behaviour.
However, a review of existing studies on TAG versus environmental
CSR in Table 2 reveals indications of positive (e.g., Ylönen & Laine,
2015), negative (e.g., Preuss, 2012) and especially no (e.g., Lanis &
Richardson, 2015) or mixed relationships. The relationship diverges
across (and partly within) these studies as it does for the aggregated
CSR concept: there is a within environmental CSR element ambiguity
for the CTB–environmental CSR relationship.11 To the extent that
stable, general relationships exist, these results mean that additional
mediating factors should be considered. Based on a novel use of le-
gitimacy theory, it will be argued in the hypothesis section below that it
is necessary to separate mandatory and voluntary CSR actions to clarify
relationships between tax behaviour and CSR elements.
4. Issues in previous literature arising from the measurement of CSR
Another issue that may affect the CTB–CSR relationship is oper-
ationalisation of performance. Environmental performance comprises
issues concerning status and periodic change in environmental impacts,
activities, objectives, risks, opportunities and such. Additionally, en-
vironmental performance includes disclosure of information about
those issues. Studies on the CTB/environmental CSR interplay are split
accordingly (Ylönen & Laine, 2015). Lanis and Richardson (2012),
Preuss (2010, 2012), partly Sikka (2010) and Ylönen and Laine (2015)
employ environmental disclosure, whereas Laguir et al. (2015); Landry
et al. (2013); Lanis and Richardson (2015) and Ströter (2016) measure
environmental CSR through database scores/rankings by showing, e.g.
impacts (such as emissions) and/or perceptions of reputation/perfor-
mance. The choice of approach is important because the measures have
different properties and may answer different questions.
Corporate environmental disclosure is used as performance in-
dicator in this study. Disclosure has multiple properties. It is (partly)
regulated and conveyed in corporate annual reporting, as is CTB.
Disclosure is an integral part of environmental performance, while at
the same time it is supposed to depict the impact aspect of performance,
both of which are likely to affect stakeholders’ perceptions of impact/
environmental CSR. It may be difficult and require time and resources
to significantly change environmental impacts, something that is also
affected by external and unexpected events, whereas the content and
quality of disclosure is easier and faster to change in line with corporate
Table 1






Davis et al. (2016) X X
Hoi et al. (2013) X X
Landry et al. (2013) X X X
Lanis and Richardson (2012) X
Lanis and Richardson (2013) X
Lanis and Richardson (2015) X
Muller and Kolk (2015) X
Sikka (2010) (X) (X)
Watson (2015) X X X
Ylönen and Laine (2015) (X) (X) (X)
Brackets indicate conclusions or interpretations of results in qualitative studies.
9 The industry itself states that tax payment is a vital CSR contribution.
Analysis of whether this actually means lower TAG than other industries is out
of scope and left for other studies.
10 Managers and other stakeholders of US firms for which CSR is important do
not (necessarily) view payment of corporate taxes as socially responsible (Davis
et al., 2016; Dowling, 2014).
11 Although the results are not disclosed here, the meta-study showed that
similar ambiguous results are found for all individual CSR elements reviewed in
several extant studies, not only for the environment.
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strategic decisions.12 Disclosure also widens the latitude of strategic
considerations through opportunistic impression management con-
cerning actual environmental impact and its consequences, intentions
of improvement/change in environmental performance and perceptions
of what a legitimate impact means—or should mean (Lindblom, 2010).
This is important because the growing public interest in environmental
CSR (and CTB) is likely to increase associated legitimacy risks. En-
vironmental disclosure is an important strategic device to ensure le-
gitimacy (Lindblom, 2010; Suchman, 1995), and both environmental
disclosure and CTB are strategic corporate choices (Adams & Whelan,
2009; Huseynov & Klamm, 2012; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000).
5. Hypothesis development
Studies on the CTB–CSR interplay have focused mainly on aggregate
measures of CSR. Aggregation dilutes relationships with CTB when
signs and significance differ for individual CSR elements. Hence, CSR
elements should be analysed separately (Laguir et al., 2015; Landry
et al., 2013).
Almost all CSR-reporting studies treat legitimacy as a one-dimen-
sional concept (2005, Campbell et al., 2003; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho,
Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Deegan
et al., 2000; Patten & Crampton, 2003; Patten, 1992; Wilmshurst &
Frost, 2000). However, legitimacy should be treated as a multi-
dimensional concept (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Suchman, 1995). The
reason is that although the legitimacy dimensions (regulatory, moral,
cognitive and pragmatic) “often reinforce one another, they occasion-
ally can come into conflict” (Suchman, 1995, p. 85). Aggregation may
dilute effects. The aggregation of legitimacy dimensions may thus dilute
effects or disguise the interplay between individual dimensions.
Separation of legitimacy dimensions is particularly relevant in
connection with regulations (Fallan, 2016). Mandatory reporting is
affected by regulatory, moral, cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy risks.
Only the latter three are relevant for voluntary reporting. Regulatory
legitimacy risks differ for mandatory and voluntary actions. There may
also be interaction effects on the other dimensions. Differences between
mandatory and voluntary actions are supported by the view that busi-
nesses’ responsibility is to maximise profit while conforming to the
“rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom” (Friedman, 1970). The rules of law concern regulatory
legitimacy risks as well as moral, cognitive and pragmatic risks that
pertain to rules of ethical custom. The distinctive characteristics of
regulatory legitimacy are also illustrated by the separation of legal,
ethical, philanthropic and economic responsibilities in the CSR pyr-
amid—hence, mandatory and voluntary elements of CSR (Carroll,
1991). This is reinforced by prospect theory, because the emotion of,
e.g., paying a tax is different from that of giving away the same amount
voluntarily (Kahneman & Tversky, [1979] 2000).
All identified extant, publicly available studies on the CTB–CSR re-
lationship aggregate mandatory and voluntary actions into one measure.
The existence of regulatory legitimacy risks means that the motivation
for strategies behind mandatory and voluntary environmental disclosure
may differ (Fallan, 2016; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Lindblom, 2010). Hence,
the use of total environmental disclosure (the aggregate of mandatory
and voluntary disclosure), e.g. Lanis and Richardson (2012), may dilute
the actual relationships with CTB. Mandatory and voluntary reporting
should be analysed separately (Fallan, 2015). The relevance of such an
approach is emphasised because regulation versus voluntarism is one of
the main debates in the accounting and CSR/environmental reporting
literature (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008). Therefore, the current study
explores mandatory and voluntary actions in connection with the re-
lationship between TAG and environmental reporting.
Taxes are important contributions to society, which should make it
more difficult to insulate the firm against societal pressure to comply
with the tax law (stick-to-the-rules). However, while compliance with
statutory tax requirements calls for legal tax planning, it is still the
corporation’s choice to engage in unethical tax avoidance and illegal
tax evasion as well (Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010). Tax-ag-
gressive behaviour is widespread (Christensen & Murphy, 2004;
Dowling, 2014; Sikka, 2010; Ylönen & Laine, 2015).
Environmental reporting is also subject to regulation in more and
more countries (Camilleri, 2015; Nyquist, 2003). Compliance is re-
levant for mandatory disclosure of information according to law and
reporting standards, while other types of information disclosure are
voluntary. Ultimately, it is up to the corporation to decide whether,
what types of or how to report both mandatory and voluntary in-
formation (Bebbington, Kirk, & Larrinaga, 2012; Wilmshurst & Frost,
2000). There is overwhelming support in the research literature that
corporations in general do not (fully) comply with environmental re-
porting regulations (Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, Cho, & Patten, 2015;
Larrinaga et al., 2002; Luque-Vilchez & Larrinaga, 2016; Patten, 2005;
Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). Simultaneously, non-compliant companies
often disclose other types of environmental information voluntary.
Corporations’ approach is often a mix of mandatory and voluntary re-
porting (Fallan & Fallan, 2009). Reporting practices vary significantly
among companies, both for mandatory and voluntary disclosure, within
industries and companies of similar size.13
As illustrated above, it is the corporation’s decision whether to
comply with tax and environmental reporting regulations, and it is
evident that, to some degree, corporations take the opportunity to not
comply. This discretion makes it relevant to analyse mandatory versus
voluntary actions. Corporate decisions concerning CTB and environ-
mental disclosure are based on the corporations’ perception of risks and
opportunities and strategies to deal with these (Adams & Whelan, 2009;
Huseynov & Klamm, 2012; Lindblom, 2010; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000).
Strategies concerning CSR are closely connected to building legitimacy
on social and environmental issues to meet the expectations of society
for appropriate business behaviour and outcomes (Bansal & Roth,
2000). Hence, legitimacy risks are important.
Regulation entails that a normative and formal regulatory legiti-
macy risk of non-compliance exists for both CTB and environmental
reporting. Regulatory legitimacy risks enhance compliance and reduce
Table 2






Laguir et al. (2015) X X
Landry et al. (2013) X
Lanis and Richardson (2012) X
Lanis and Richardson (2015) X




Ylönen and Laine (2015) (X)
Brackets indicate conclusions or interpretations of results in qualitative studies.
12 The question of whether disclosure or impact/reputation-database perfor-
mance measures are most relevant to compare with strategic CTB actions is
complex. Relevant issues include varying time horizons for different CTB ac-
tions, both environmental measures may be affected by external and un-
expected events, and opportunism, and disclosure has some degree of persis-
tence/downward stickiness. Another featured validity and reliability challenge
is low correlation among measures (scores/rankings) within and between im-
pact/reputation databases. This is not surprising, because they match non-
comparable items (and the databases are not developed for this purpose).
13 Industry and size are among the most important explanatory factors of
environmental disclosure (Fifka, 2013).
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the likelihood of trade-offs between CTB and mandatory environmental
disclosure. To the extent that regulation changes people’s perceptions
about which CTB and environmental disclosure practices are (1) nor-
matively right, (2) taken-for-granted, or (3) in stakeholders’ self-in-
terest, moral, cognitive, and pragmatic legitimacy risks may reinforce
the effect of regulatory legitimacy risks. However, the perceived actual
regulatory legitimacy risk may be weakened somewhat by lack of
control/enforcement/negative consequences associated with non-com-
pliance.14 Pragmatic legitimacy will also vary for different stake-
holders.
Corporations may use four alternative legitimation strategies, or a
combination of the four, to manage these legitimacy risks concerning
tax payment and/or environmental CSR (Lindblom, 2010). First, legit-
imation may involve bringing the corporation’s activity into conformity
with the popular view of what is appropriate tax payment and/or en-
vironmental CSR—making internal adjustments to close the legitimacy
gap. Second, the corporation may consider the current tax payment to
be in accordance with legal tax planning and/or environmental CSR to
be appropriate and attempt to demonstrate this to change stakeholders’
perception of actual performance and thereby close the legitimacy gap.
Third, the legitimation strategy may be to manipulate stakeholders to
perceive tax payment and/or environmental CSR as appropriate,
without any attempt to change actual performance or societal ex-
pectations so that they match. Fourth, the strategy may be to close the
legitimacy gap by attempting to change societal expectations about
corporate tax payment and/or environmental CSR instead of changing
actual performance, such as educating/informing the relevant stake-
holders about trade-offs concerning the provision of other favourable
contributions to society (e.g., arguing that low corporate tax payment is
necessary to maintain jobs or afford efforts to combat environmental
challenges). Several of these four strategies are illustrated in, e.g.,
Vuontisjörvi (2013).
Strategies 1 and 2 will reduce the necessity of trade-offs because
corporate actions concerning tax payment and environmental CSR are,
or will be, in line with societal expectations. Strategy 2 indicates that
the corporation actually abides by the regulations, refraining from tax
measures other than legal tax planning and conforming to mandatory
environmental disclosure practices. Strategy 1 means that behaviour is
approaching compliance. The opposite is true for strategies 3 and 4,
which offer scenarios in which corporations choose not to comply with
regulations in all areas. Hence, trade-offs are more likely. Still, strategy
4 may be more prone to trade-offs across CSR elements (which is the
current interest), whereas strategy 3, to a larger extent, also concerns
trade-off considerations within elements of CSR (e.g., with a true and
fair view).
Additionally, the theory suggests that the existence of regulations
will increase the likelihood of using strategies 1 and 2, because the
regulatory legitimacy risk makes compliant behaviour more important.
The concept of TAG does not distinguish among legal tax planning,
ethical questionable tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. Public opi-
nion will rarely be so well informed as to know whether the level of
TAG is achieved with legal measures alone (compliant behaviour) or
through avoidance and evasion as well. However, compliance with the
statutory requirements for environmental disclosure is easier to observe
and is another way to reveal a corporation’s willingness to abide by the
law. Compliance with these regulations may serve as a surrogate/signal
for CTB (strategies 1 and 2), even though mandatory disclosure may
also be part of more opportunistic strategies (3 and 4). Regulatory le-
gitimacy risks increase the inclination to choose strategies 1 and 2 for
both CTB and environmental disclosure.
Based on legitimacy risk and legitimation strategy perspectives, the
relationship between TAG and mandatory environmental disclosure is
likely to be negative. Trade-offs between these elements of CSR are
expected only to a limited extent. Even if there is a widespread aversion
to pay any form of tax, a corporation complying with mandatory en-
vironmental requirements will more likely follow the letter and spirit of
the tax law. If management prioritises a stick-to-the-rules strategy for
the corporation, it will probably do so both for tax payments and for
mandatory environmental reporting (and vice versa). This is hypothe-
sised thus:
H1. There is a negative relationship between corporate tax-aggressive
behaviour and the degree of mandatory environmental disclosure.
CTB is regulated by law and, hence, is subject to regulatory legiti-
macy risks as well as moral, cognitive and pragmatic risks. Conversely,
environmental disclosure is potentially, to a large degree, voluntary.
Voluntary environmental actions are only subject to moral, cognitive
and pragmatic legitimacy risks. The absence of regulatory legitimacy
risks indicates that the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is higher
for voluntary than for mandatory disclosure. While reporting quality
differs significantly among companies, environmental disclosure is
often found to be incomplete and unrelated to the corporations’ actual
environmental performance, dominated by positive and lack of nega-
tive information (even during environmental crises) and lack of quan-
titative, specific and verified information (Adams, 2004; Deegan et al.,
2000; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Niskanen & Nieminen, 2001; Patten &
Crampton, 2003; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). Because of the lack of reg-
ulatory legitimacy risk, the relationship between CTB and voluntary
environmental disclosure is likely to differ from the situation predicted
for mandatory disclosure.15
Disclosure has a dual role in this CSR/legitimacy context. It is both a
legitimation tool (Lindblom, 2010) and an integral part of environ-
mental performance. The latter concerns the objective of providing
useful information for stewardship/accountability and resource allo-
cation purposes (Fallan, 2016; Gjesdal, 1981). Empirical studies of CSR
reporting quality strongly indicate that voluntary environmental dis-
closure is mostly a legitimation device and, only to a lesser extent, an
accountability mechanism (Boiral, 2013; Patten, 2005; Patten &
Crampton, 2003). The hypothesis development in this text considers
disclosure only as a legitimation tool, the aspect that is currently per-
ceived to be most relevant.
Legitimacy theory predicts that corporations respond to pressure
from society/multiple stakeholder groups by providing voluntary en-
vironmental information to legitimise their existence and actions and
demonstrate society’s need for their services. Lindblom’s (2010) four
legitimation strategies illustrate how and why corporations use volun-
tary environmental disclosure in different CTB scenarios. Strategies 1
and 2 are scenarios where TAG is at or approaching an acceptable level,
in line with the expectations of the general public. Many stakeholders
perceive this as good CSR performance. Companies may want to make
CTB disclosures to inform the stakeholders about it. The perceived le-
gitimacy risk is low. There is no need to offset CTB legitimacy risks by
improving legitimacy on other CSR elements through increased dis-
closures. On the contrary, a good CSR standing on tax reduces the need
for voluntary environmental disclosure to complement mandatory en-
vironmental disclosures and improve environmental legitimacy. Hence,
the degree of voluntary environmental disclosure is low, ceteris par-
ibus. The positive relationship between TAG and the degree of volun-
tary environmental disclosure is in line with a trade-off between these
CSR elements.
14 Auditors are not required to confirm the “truth” of the disclosed informa-
tion (compare statements with underlying circumstances), only that companies
disclose information about the required topics/content. The latter task will
rarely be significant concerning an audit opinion. The government has never
enforced the environmental reporting regulations.
15 Although the regulatory legitimacy risk might be lower for voluntary en-
vironmental disclosure, there are still potential litigation and business risks if
such disclosure misleads investors and customers.
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Strategies 3 and 4 are situations in which TAG is relatively high. The
regulatory, moral, cognitive and partly pragmatic16 CTB legitimacy
risks are higher than for the other strategies. The opportunistic strategy
3 focuses mostly on manipulative CTB disclosures (a within-CTB trade-
off). The effect on and degree of voluntary environmental disclosure is
likely to be relatively low, ceteris paribus. Hence, only a limited extent
of trade-offs between CSR elements is expected. Strategy 4, on the other
hand, ensures an acceptable level of legitimacy overall by compensating
low CTB legitimacy with increased environmental legitimacy. Here the
attention is directed to environmental issues (their environmental ac-
tions/measures and so on) by extensive positive voluntary environ-
mental disclosures to change expectations about CTB. Companies may
admit that they are tax aggressive, but that such behaviour, e.g., pro-
vides resources to prevent salmon escapes and disease (solves en-
vironmental problems). Here, the positive relationship between a high
TAG and high degree of voluntary environmental disclosure indicates a
trade-off between these CSR elements. In practice, empirical findings
indicate that a combination of strategies 3 and 4 is common: firms avoid
or provide opportunistic communication concerning high TAG while
engaging in voluminous positive voluntary disclosures on other CSR
elements (Sikka, 2010; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). This is also in line with
trade-off arguments.
To summarise, legitimacy risks and Lindblom’s strategies/scenarios
for voluntary disclosure as a legitimation tool indicate a high likelihood
for trade-offs. Trade-offs may occur for companies with both high and
low TAG. The argument is further strengthened by Lindblom’s (2010)
recognition that companies may apply several strategies simultaneously
concerning different issues, both proactive and reactive. Hence the
likelihood of trade-offs concerning voluntary disclosure, undertaken at
any point in time by many companies, increases. This is hypothesised
below:
H2. There is a positive relationship between corporate tax-aggressive
behaviour and the degree of voluntary environmental disclosure.
The hypotheses above indicate that the relationships between cor-
porate TAG and mandatory and voluntary environmental disclosure,
respectively, move in opposite directions. The consequence is that the
relationship between corporate TAG and total environmental disclosure
(the aggregate of mandatory and voluntary reporting) is diluted. It
becomes uncertain or absent, in line with the mixed results of extant
studies in Tables 1 and 2.
6. Research design
6.1. Sample
The hypotheses are tested based on cross-sectional data from the an-
nual reports of publicly listed corporations on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE) and corporate information provided by OSE. A total of 269 com-
panies were listed on OSE (including Oslo Access). Initially, the data set
consisted of 147 of these companies randomly selected to study environ-
mental disclosure in a Norwegian setting. The extensive manual effort
required to collect environmental disclosure data necessitate the sample
size to be small. This sample was used in the present paper after adding tax
behaviour data from the selected companies to answer the present re-
search questions. The initial sample included some corporations not sub-
ject to the ordinary Norwegian Tax Act. The tax regimes of oil and gas
companies in Norway (within the jurisdiction of the Petroleum Tax Act)
and the shipping industry differ significantly from the statutory tax rates in
the ordinary Norwegian Tax Act. These companies were excluded from the
sample. Next, companies that have negative income were dropped to
prevent distortion of the TAG measurement (Lanis & Richardson, 2012).
The second dependent variable (TAG2) has a lower dropout number than
the first (TAG1) because it includes three years’ income data. All compa-
nies in the net sample are within the jurisdiction of the Norwegian Tax
Act, the Norwegian Accounting Act, and the Norwegian Public Limited
Liability Companies Act (Table 3).
6.2. Operationalisation of the dependent variables
In the corporate taxation literature there is a strong emphasis on the
use of several alternative tax measures (Plesko, 2003). This illustrates
challenges in measuring tax behaviour, even though proxies exist. In
the CSR literature, seven of the 13 identified, publicly available,
quantitative studies on the relationship between tax behaviour and CSR
employ more than one measure (2015, Hoi et al., 2013; Huseynov &
Klamm, 2012; Laguir et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2013; Lanis &
Richardson, 2012; Ströter, 2016). Within each of those seven, the re-
lationship between CTB and CSR differs between tax measures in three
studies (though for some, just barely) (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012;
Laguir et al., 2015; Sträter, 2016). Still, to obtain more robust results,
two CTB measures are used in the present study: TAG1 and TAG2.
TAG1 and TAG2 are measured based on effective tax rates (ETR).
ETR is chosen because it captures important parts of tax-aggressive
strategies. It is suitable because it is easy for stakeholders to compare
effective ETR and the statutory tax rate for corporations. If deemed too
low, it could easily cause public outrage. ETR is also the most com-
monly used measure of TAG in the corporate taxation literature (Chen
et al., 2010; Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Lanis & Richardson, 2011), and 9
of the 11 identified regression-based CSR/CTB studies use ETR mea-
sures (Davis, Guenther, Krull, & Williams, 2016; Hoi et al., 2013;
Huseynov & Klamm, 2012; Laguir et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2013;
Lanis & Richardson, 2012, 2013; Muller & Kolk, 2015; Watson, 2015).
Discussions on advantages and disadvantages of ETR as CTB proxy are
found in, e.g., Dowling (2014); Laguir et al. (2015), Lanis and
Richardson (2012, 2015) and Watson (2015). ETR is here defined as
income tax expense currently payable (from continuing operations)
divided by pre-tax accounting (book) income. This measure is referred
to as cash ETR in the literature. ETR is truncated into the range between
0 and 1, in line with previous studies (Lanis and Richardson, 2012). The
dependent variables, TAG1 and TAG2, equals (1–ETR), yielding a vari-
able where increasing values indicate high TAG. TAG1 is based on cash
ETR data for one year (2009)—cf., e.g., Hoi et al. (2013); Laguir et al.
(2015); Landry et al. (2013); Lanis and Richardson (2012), and Watson
(2015). Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) preferred long-term ETR
measures because of the possible fluctuation in annual rates. Huseynov
and Klamm (2012) and Davis et al. (2016) used such variables.
Therefore, TAG2 is based on three years’ cash ETR data. The statutory
tax rate in Norway on taxable income was 28% both in 2009, 2010 and
2012, which is included in TAG2.17
ETRs frequently differ from the statutory tax rate for corporations.




Companies listed on OSE (including Oslo Access) 269 269
Initial sample of OSE companies randomly selected 147 147
− Companies not subject to the ordinary Norwegian tax regime
removed
13 13
= Companies subject to the ordinary Norwegian tax regime 134 134
− Companies having negative pre-tax income for a single year
(TAG1)/three years (TAG2)
42 23
= Net sample for 2009 (TAG1)/2009, 2010 and 2012 (TAG2) 92 111
16 The pragmatic legitimacy risk among owners/shareholders is low with high
TAG, but it is higher concerning e.g. government.
17 2012 was chosen to have data further away from the financial crises. From
2014 to 2019 the statutory tax rate in Norway was reduced to 22%.
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(the current tax payable generated from taxable income) and data from
the financial accounts (pre-tax income based on generally accepted
accounting principles). The book-tax differences between the financial
accounting income and the taxable income generate both temporary
and permanent differences that contribute to variation in ETRs (Lanis &
Richardson, 2012). Tax-aggressive behaviour includes different ways to
lower taxable income that may affect corporate taxes by reducing tax-
able income while financial accounting income is maintained. The
consequence is lower ETR and higher TAG. The critical tax-related issue
in the present study is how stakeholders perceive tax-aggressive stra-
tegies and the reputational costs of such behaviour (e.g., Graham et al.,
2014; Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009).
6.3. Operationalisation of the independent variables
6.3.1. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure
Total environmental disclosure consists of mandatory and voluntary
disclosure. The operationalisation of these variables (TOTDISC,
MANDISC and VOLDISC, respectively) is based on content analysis,
which is the most common approach for measuring the environmental
information content of reporting (Fifka, 2013). Content analysis pro-
vides a systematic numerical basis for comparing companies’ dis-
closures through quantitative analysis. The meaning of each relevant
sentence in companies’ reporting is classified into predefined, mutually
exclusive categories. The chosen disclosure categories and an associated
numerical rating system make up a quality index of disclosure
(Wiseman, 1982).
The quality index in the current study is an adaptation fromWiseman
(1982)—a widely used approach (Guidry & Patten, 2010). The system
consists of two types of disclosure categories, (I) information content and
(II) other information quality characteristics, and a numerical rating
system (III). First, there are 17 content categories (I). The categories are
adapted from a categorisation system developed by Ljungdahl (1999),
UNCTC (1991) and Fallan and Fallan (2009). The content categories are
listed in Table 4 and described in Appendix A. The breadth of disclosed
information content, the number of categories disclosed, is a quality di-
mension in itself. Second, disclosures concerning each of the 17 content
categories are reviewed to identify additional information quality char-
acteristics (II). Whether disclosures are monetary18, quantitative19 or
narrative and whether they are company-specific20 or general21 is re-
corded in fixed subcategories. Because several sentences may be assigned
to each content category, several of these subcategories may be present
for each of the 17 content categories for each company. Third, according
to Wiseman’s (1982) rating system (III), three points are awarded for
monetary and quantitative information, two points for company-specific
information and one point for general and narrative information. To sum
up, this means that the annual report is analysed for the presence or
absence of information concerning 17 content categories and five sub-
categories. The total disclosure score (TOTDISC) per company, the de-
gree of TOTDISC, is obtained by summarising the points awarded from
the numerical rating system for all present categories and subcategories
in this 17×5 matrix.
Additionally, the hypotheses require a distinction between manda-
tory and voluntary disclosure. In Norway, the regulation of corporate
environmental reporting is closely tied to accounting regulations.22 The
Norwegian Accounting Act specifies enterprise types with statutory
obligations to keep accounts according to the law, and these enterprises
were in 2009 subject to regulation of environmental disclosure in the
board of directors’ report. The statutory obligation to report environ-
mental information is stated in the Norwegian Accounting Act § 3-3a,23
as illustrated in Table 4. The Norwegian Accounting Act is characterised
as framework legislation without detailed regulation (Kvifte & Johnsen,
2008). Its legal provisions are supplemented by more detailed, separate
reporting requirements and recommendations in the accompanying
accounting standard—the NRS 16 board of directors’ report. The en-
vironmental reporting requirements of NRS 16, including the Norwe-
gian Accounting Act provision, are quoted in Appendix B. The board of
directors must provide information pertaining to the environmental
impact of running the business, including inputs and products in a life-
cycle perspective, and measures to prevent and reduce negative impact.
The statutory requirements mostly address information content, cf. (I)
above, and to some extent form (“quantity”), cf. (II) above. Together,
Table 4 and appendices A and B depict mandatory disclosure. Three of
the 17 content categories match the mandatory environmental dis-
closure requirements, as outlined in Table 4. The variable MANDISC is
operationalised by counting the points regarding the three mandatory
content categories (a 3× 5 matrix).
Other aspects regarding how much, what type and in what form
environmental information is disclosed are left up to the company.
These content types constitute voluntary disclosure. In this study
VOLDISC is operationalised by the remaining 14 categories in Table 4.
VOLDISC is measured by adding up the points for the 14 voluntary
content categories (14×5 matrix).
The annual report was selected as the only data source for en-
vironmental disclosure. This is because annual reports appear to be
representative of all corporate environmental disclosure content (Tilt,
2008) and include the board of directors’ report.
6.3.2. Control variables
To control for other effects on corporate TAG, some commonly
adopted variables in behavioural studies on financial, tax and CSR ac-
counting are included (Fifka, 2013; Halme & Huse, 1997; Laguir et al.,
2015; Landry et al., 2013; Lanis & Richardson, 2012, 2013, 2015). The
operationalisation of these variables is explained below.
The size of the corporation (SIZE) is perceived as a relevant control
variable when corporate behaviour is studied (Fifka, 2013). Sales, as-
sets, market value and number of employees are common proxies
(Ljungdahl, 1999). Accounting-based measures (sales and total assets)
are dropped because of industry differences in how income statements
and balance sheets are classified, e.g., the accounts of financial in-
stitutions differ from those of other industries. In line with Hoi et al.
(2013) and Watson (2015), SIZE is measured as the natural log of the
number of employees.24
Profitability and leverage measures are used in all similar studies
(Laguir et al., 2015; Lanis & Richardson, 2012). Return on equity (ROE) is
measured by profit of the year divided by equity, and debt ratio (DEBT) is
total liabilities divided by total assets (Gupta & Newberry, 1997). Both
variables are collected from the corporation’s financial statements.
CEO tenure (TENURE) is the number of years the manager has held
the office (Lanis & Richardson, 2012, 2015). TENURE is a proxy for
experience and the ability to influence the board composition and exert
power as an agent for shareholders and other stakeholders.
The degree of board ownership (BOARD) is also included in, e.g.,
Lanis and Richardson (2012, 2015). The board is the highest internal
control mechanism for monitoring the decisions and actions of top
18 E.g., costs in NOK
19 E.g., emissions in tons
20 E.g., information about a detailed and approved plan for reduction of the
company’s emissions
21 E.g., information that can be copied directly from other companies’ dis-
closure because it does not require a real commitment, such as policy state-
ments saying that the company does not want to affect the environment more
than normal for these kinds of activities
22 The Norwegian regulatory system in 2009 is described in Fallan (2016);
Nyquist (2003) and Vormedal and Ruud (2009).
23 The Norwegian Accounting Act provision equals the first paragraph of
Appendix B.
24 Robustness checks reveal that the main results are similar when SIZE is
measured by the natural log of total assets.
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management. Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) underlined the im-
portance of separating decision management and decision control in
public corporations. The separation of residual risk-bearing from deci-
sion management leads to decision systems that separate decision
management from decision control of the board of directors. The de-
cision problem between shareholders and top management can be re-
duced by means of a high degree of board member ownership. Tax
reduces the residual (income) left for the owners. BOARD is measured
by the proportion of shares owned by board members and closely
connected persons, such as spouses or persons with whom the board
member is cohabiting in a marriage-like relationship, dependent chil-
dren and enterprises in which the board member or closely connected
persons have controlling interest. BOARD is a continuous variable that
can theoretically take on values from 0 to 1.
In companies with separation of ownership and control, there is a
decision problem between the shareholders and management.
Shareholders primarily want to ensure that management decisions
maximise the value of the company and thereby positively consider
corporate tax-aggressive behaviour. If the corporation has a con-
centrated ownership with few large shareholders, internal monitoring
by the shareholders can be an effective way to solve the decision pro-
blem by reducing management power (Berle & Means, 1932). However,
in public companies with widely distributed shareholding, the costs of
internal monitoring for small shareholders may prevent them from in-
fluencing the corporation’s tax behaviour. A specialised top manage-
ment must consider how a tax-aggressive behaviour will affect the
corporation. It is easier for the top management to please other stake-
holders than the short-term interests of shareholders in corporations
with dispersed ownership because the balance of power disfavours
small shareholders. Dispersed ownership (DISPERSED) is measured as
(1 − the accumulated ownership share of the five largest owners). This
obtains increasing measurement of dispersed ownership in the analysis.
Two other structural dimensions of ownership are included: the
proportion of total shares owned by the government (GOVERN) and by
foreign investors (FOREIGN). Governmental ownership will possibly
reduce TAG, and foreign ownership will possibly enhance TAG.
However, public corporations on the stock exchange must treat every
shareholder equally.
Furthermore, the present model includes company growth oppor-
tunities (GROWTH) measured by the natural log to the market-value-of-
equity divided by the book-value-of-equity (Landry et al., 2013; Lanis &
Richardson, 2015) and asset structure (STRUCTURE) measured by fixed
assets divided by total assets (Laguir et al., 2015; Lanis & Richardson,
2015). Hence, these possible effects on TAG are uncertain and are
controlled for. AUDIT is a dichotomous variable concerning audit opi-
nions where companies with deviations disclosed in the audit report
have the score of 1, and companies with a clean audit report have a
score of 0.
Similar studies control for industry sector (INDSEC) (Laguir et al.,
2015; Lanis & Richardson, 2012). The current classification is done by
OSE, based on the Global industry classification standard (GICS). Be-
cause of the sample size, the 12 GICS sectors are merged into five, based
on both average TAG and perceived similarity of operations or output.
INDSEC1 includes telecommunication services and information tech-
nology; INDSEC2 consists of energy and utilities; INDSEC3 contains
industrials, materials and consumer discretionary; INDSEC4 is finance,
real estate and equity certificates; and INDSEC5 is health care and
consumer staples. Each variable is measured by a dichotomous variable
with the score of 1 if the company belongs to that sector and 0 if it does
not. (The highest VIF values in the regression analysis are between
industry variables. These VIFs were reduced with fewer industry vari-
ables.)
6.4. The regression models
The regression models are based on cross-sectional analyses of data
for revealing the association between corporate TAG and environ-
mental disclosure. An ordinary least square (OLS) estimation is used.
Model A adopts the independent variable TOTDISC consisting of the
sum of mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
(A)TAGj = α0 + β1TOTDISC + β2SIZE + β3DEBT + β4ROE +
β5TENURE + β6BOARD + β7DISPERSED + β8GOVERN + β9FOREIGN
+ β10GROWTH + β11STRUCTURE + β12AUDIT + β13 INDSEC1 +
β14INDSEC2 + β15INDSEC3 + β16INDSEC4 + β17INDSEC5 + εi
The notation j is 1 for TAG1 and 2 for TAG2.
Model B differs from model A by including the independent vari-
ables for mandatory and voluntary environmental disclosure, respec-
tively, instead of the aggregated variable of total disclosure. This model
is designed to answer the questions put forth in the two hypotheses.
(B) TAGj = α0 + β1MANDISC + β2VOLDISC +β3SIZE + β4DEBT
+ β5ROE + β6TENURE+ β7BOARD+ β8DISPERSED+ β9GOVERN+
β10FOREIGN + β11GROWTH + β12STRUCTURE + β13AUDIT +
Table 4
Environmental content categories. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
Category no. Content category Mandatory environmental disclosure Voluntary environmental disclosure
1 Environmental impacteprocesses X
1a Type of impact X
1b Impact quantity X
1c Measures to reduce (increase) negative (positive) impacts X
2 Environmental impacteproducts X
2a Type of impact X
2b Impact quantity X
2c Measures to reduce (increase) negative (positive) impacts X
3 No environmental impact X
4 Environmental policy X
5 Environmental objectives X
6 Environmental authorities X
7 Environmental events X
8 Environmental organization X
9 Environmental audits X
10 Audits of environmental disclosure X
11 Environmental investments X
12 Environmental costs/revenues X
13 Environmental liabilities X
14 Clarification of environmental concepts X
15 Accounting (reporting) principles X
16 Economic non-monetary information (demand-side) X
17 Economic non-monetary information (supply-side) X
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Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables. TAG has a
theoretical range of 0–1. The actual range of TAG is from 0 to 1; the
mean TAG1 is .75 (SD= .24), and TAG2 is .80 (SD= .19). According to
the Norwegian tax law, the formal corporation tax rate was 28% for
these three years, which is equivalent to a TAG score of .72. TAG scores
higher than .72 may indicate tax-aggressive behaviour.
TOTDISC is the sum of MANDISC and VOLDISC. The actual range is
from 0 to 55, and the mean is 10.94 (SD=11.02). MANDISC varies
from 0 to 15, and the mean is 4.23 (SD=3.48). VOLDISC varies from 0
to 46, with a mean score of 6.71 (SD=8.37).
The mean score of SIZE measured by the natural log of number of
employees is 6.23 (SD=1.97). This implies that the actual mean
number of employees is 2 558 (SD=6 054) and range from 1 to 40 300
employees. DEBT ratio has a mean score of .63 (SD= .22). ROE differs
widely among the corporations and has a mean score of −.01
(SD= .62). TENURE, the number of years the manager has held the
office, ranges from 0 to 33 years. Mean tenure is 6.07 years
(SD=7.08). BOARD, the proportion of shares own by board members,
varies from 0 to 88%. The control variables for ownership structure are
as follows. DISPERSED, the proportion of shares owned by people other
than the five largest owners, ranges from 5% to 85%. The mean of
DISPERSED is .49 (SD= .22). GOVERN varies from 0 to .54, with a
modest mean governmental ownership of .02 (SD= .10). The propor-
tion of total shares own by foreign investors (FOREIGN) varies from 0%
to 81% and has a mean of .19 (SD= .22). GROWTH shows a mean of
6.99 (SD=1.03). The STRUCTURE mean is .43 (SD= .29). The five
industry sectors have a mean score indicating their relative part of the
sample: INDSEC1 counts 16%, INDSEC2 11%, INDSEC3 26%, INDSEC4
31% and INDSEC5 16%, which add up to 100%.
7.2. Correlation results
Table 6 shows the correlation among all variables. Pearson’s r and
two-tailed significance levels are included. Below, only the bivariate
relationships between tax-aggressive behaviour and the independent
variables are commented on.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean SD
TAG1 92 0 1 0.75 0.24
TAG2 111 0 1 0.8 0.19
TOTDISC 111 0 55 10.94 11.02
MANDISC 111 0 15 4.23 3.48
VOLDISC 111 0 46 6.71 8.37
SIZE 111 0 10.6 6.23 1.97
DEBT 111 0.06 0.96 0.63 0.22
ROE 111 −4.05 1.45 −0.01 0.62
TENURE 111 0 33 6.07 7.08
BOARD 111 0 0.88 0.15 0.22
DISPERSED 111 0.05 0.85 0.49 0.22
GOVERN 111 0 0.54 0.02 0.1
FOREIGN 111 0 0.81 0.19 0.22
GROWTH 111 4.02 9.84 6.99 1.04
STRUCTURE 111 0 0.99 0.43 0.29
AUDIT 111 0 1 0.03 0.16
INDSEC1 111 0 1 0.16 0.37
INDSEC2 111 0 1 0.11 0.31
INDSEC3 111 0 1 0.26 0.44
INDSEC4 111 0 1 0.31 0.46
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There are significant negative bivariate relationships between each
of the TAG measures and SIZE (r=−.22, p < .05; r=−.21,
p < .05), which reveals that the biggest companies are less tax ag-
gressive. INDSEC3 (r=−.20, p < .10; r=−.23, p < .05) shows that
companies within industrial, materials and consumer discretionary are
less aggressive than in other industries. There are negative bivariate
relations between TAG and MANDISC (r=−.31, p < .01; r=−.34,
p < .01). There are also negative significant bivariate relationships
between TAG1 and GOVERN (r=−.21, p < .05) and between TAG2
and TOTDISC (r=−.17, p < .10).
The correlation analysis reveals two significant positive bivariate
relationships, between TAG1 and ROE (r= .20, p < .10) and BOARD
(r= .31, p < .01). The bivariate correlations between tax-aggressive
behaviour and VOLDISC are low and not significant (r=−.02 and
r=−.08).
All bivariate relationships may be diluted or strengthened, and the
signs may change when the other variables are controlled for in the
multiple regressions below. The regressions will reveal whether the
hypotheses are supported.
7.3. Regression results
Regression Model 1A in Table 7 comprises TAG1, TOTDISC and all
other independent variables except MANDISC and VOLDISC. It explains
11% of the variation in the dependent variable. INDSEC1 is omitted
(reference industry). There are two significant relationships: a positive
between TAG1 and BOARD (β = .35, p < .01) and negative for IN-
DSEC3 (β = −.36, p < .05). This model states that TOTDISC has no
significant partial relationship with TAG1.
The difference between Models 1 A and 1B is that TOTDISC is re-
placed by MANDISC and VOLDISC. The independent variables in Model
1B increase the explanatory power of variation of TAG1 up to 17%. Like
Model 1 A, BOARD (β = .25, p < .05) and INDSEC3 (β = −.30,
p < .10) are significantly associated with TAG1 in Model 1B. This
model also reveals a significant relationship between TAG1 and ROE (β
= .30, p < .10). The most important results for this study are that (1)
MANDISC (H1) is significantly related to tax-aggressive behaviour in a
negative way (β = −.31, p < .05) and (2) there is strong and sig-
nificant support for a positive relationship between TAG1 and VOLDISC
(H2) (β = .33, p < .05).
Model 2 A and 2B include TAG2, and represent robustness tests for
Model 1A and 1B, respectively. In these models, INDSEC2 is the omitted
(reference) industry variable. In accordance with Model 1A, Model 2 A
reveals no significant relationship between tax-aggressive behaviour
and TOTDISC. This model explains 6% of the variation in the dependent
variable. TAG2 is significantly associated with BOARD (β = .22,
p < .05), INDSEC1 (β = .36, p < .05), INDSEC4 (β = .37, p < .10)
and INDSEC5 (β = .32, p < .05).
Model 2B shows an important industry association with TAG2.
INDSEC1 (β = .39, p < .01), INDSEC4 (β = .39 p < .05) and IN-
DSEC5 (β= .30, p < .05) are positively related to TAG compared with
INDSEC2. There is a significant and negative relationship between
TAG2 and MANDISC (H1) (β = −.43, p < .01) and a significant, po-
sitive relationship when it comes to VOLDISC (H2) (β = .28, p < .05).
Model 2B explains 15% of the variation in TAG.25
8. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore indications of strategic trade-
offs between corporate tax behaviour and corporate environmental per-
formance disclosures by examining the relationship between these ele-
ments of CSR. To survive, companies must be perceived as legitimate by
Table 7
Multiple regression analyses: tax aggressiveness (dependent variable), standardised beta coefficient, t-value and significance level.
Independent variables Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B
TAG1 and TOTDISC TAG1, MANDISC and VOLDISC TAG2 and TOTDISC TAG2, MANDISC and VOLDISC
β t β t β t β T
Constant 3.05*** 3.19*** 1.70* 2.15**
TOTDISC 0.08 0.62 −0.07 −0.59
MANDISC −0.31 −2.06** −0.43 −3.21***
VOLDISC 0.33 2.20** 0.28 2.01**
SIZE −0.18 −1.13 −0.17 −1.09 −0.04 −0.25 −0.03 −0.19
DEBT −0.13 −0.69 −0.10 −0.58 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.18
ROE 0.30 1.91* 0.30 1.98* −0.18 −1.62 −0.18 −1.67*
TENURE −0.04 −0.32 −0.04 −0.33 0.01 0.06 −0.01 −0.06
BOARD 0.35 2.91*** 0.25 2.06** 0.22 2.02** 0.14 1.25
DISPERSED 0.13 0.85 0.08 0.51 0.09 0.68 0.02 0.14
GOVERN −0.07 −0.56 −0.07 −0.64 −0.06 −0.56 −0.07 −0.72
FOREIGN −0.06 −0.45 −0.06 −0.45 −0.03 −0.22 −0.01 −0.05
GROWTH −0.20 −1.06 −0.18 −0.99 0.16 1.12 0.13 1.01
STRUCTURE 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.17 −0.02 −0.13
AUDIT −0.05 −0.43 −0.08 −0.66 0.00 0.03 −0.01 −0.07
INDSEC1 (omitted in Model 1A and 1B) 0.36 2.48** 0.39 2.80***
INDSEC2 (omitted in Model 2A and 2B) −0.16 −1.09 −0.15 −1.04
INDSEC3 −0.36 −2.15** −0.30 −1.83* 0.12 0.73 0.21 1.32
INDSEC4 −0.24 −1.04 −0.21 −0.91 0.37 1.79* 0.39 2.00**
INDSEC5 −0.12 −0.73 −0.13 −0.83 0.32 2.15** 0.30 2.10**
F-value 1.73* 2.06** 1.47 2.10**
Adj. R2 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.15
VIF min.‒max. 1.44–5.46 1.44–5.48 1.21–4.98 1.21–4.98
N 92 92 111 111
Significance level (two-tailed): * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. VIF=Variance Inflation Factor.
INDSEC1 = telecom and IT; INDSEC2 = energy and utilities; INDSEC3 = materials, industries and consumer discretionary; INDSEC4 = finance, equity certificates
and real estate; INDSEC5 = consumer staples and health care.
25 We have also completed a two-stage least-square analysis where the in-
dependent variables MANDISC and VOLDISC are included as predictors and the
rest of the independent variables as instrumentals show that the OLS estimation
in Table 7 is robust.
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multiple stakeholders. Still, the interests of key stakeholders, for example
investors and the government/society as a whole, on matters such as CTB
and environmental disclosure are often incompatible. In a legitimacy
theory framework, these stakeholder conflicts imply pragmatic legitimacy
risks. Because both tax payment and disclosure are affected by companies’
strategies and decisions, the overall question is whether companies stra-
tegically balance the interests of important stakeholders by applying
trade-offs among these elements of CSR.
The study support hypothesis 1. Validity of this result is enhanced
by the fact that it is similar for both dependent variables and supported
by the theoretical basis. There is a negative relationship between cor-
porate tax-aggressive behaviour and the degree of mandatory en-
vironmental disclosure. Those corporations that most fully comply with
the mandatory requirements of environmental disclosure are also less
tax-aggressive and comply with the tax rules. Regulatory legitimacy
risks increase benefits of stick-to-the-rules attitudes for both CSR ele-
ments. Regulations may also affect moral, cognitive and pragmatic le-
gitimacy risks in the same direction over time. Adoption of such stick-
to-the-rules strategies is in accordance with Lindblom’s (2010) first two
scenarios, where the corporation’s activity is in or will be brought into
conformity with the popular view of what is appropriate tax payment
and mandatory disclosure. Even Friedman (1970) assumes conformance
to rules of laws and ethics. The hypothesis would suggest that this is the
most likely interpretation. A negative relationship is also consistent
with companies that simultaneously are highly tax aggressive and ne-
glect environmental reporting regulations. This choice of action is most
similar to Lindblom’s strategies 2 and 3. It is rational from a Friedman
perspective if low costs concerning tax and disclosure increase profits.
Then pragmatic legitimacy risks dominated by investors’ interests (and
cognitive legitimacy risks based on institutionalised liberal market
economy views) outweigh regulatory and moral legitimacy risks. In
such cost-benefit considerations, lack of enforcement and no negative
consequences for non-compliance reduce regulatory legitimacy risks.26
Irrespective of interpretation of the negative relationship, there is no
indication of trade-offs between mandated behaviour concerning tax
and environmental performance disclosures.
The analyses in this study also support hypothesis 2, with the same
validity enhancing attributes as described for hypothesis 1. There is a
positive relationship between corporate tax-aggressive behaviour and
the degree of voluntary environmental disclosure. Corporations with
high degree of TAG are inclined to have a high degree of voluntary
environmental disclosure as well. Lindblom’s (2010) fourth scenario is a
clear example of such strategic trade-offs. For example, a large extent of
positive voluntary environmental disclosure can be used to shift focus
away from inappropriate tax payments or to legitimate high TAG be-
cause it is necessary to finance efforts to combat environmental chal-
lenges. Strategic tax-aggressive behaviour is commonly observed in
empirical studies (Sikka, 2010; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). It is also well
documented that the motivation for voluntary environmental disclosure
often is of strategic nature: firms mostly use it as a legitimacy device
and not an accountability mechanism (Deegan et al., 2000; Niskanen &
Nieminen, 2001; Patten & Crampton, 2003; Walden & Schwartz, 1997).
Conversely, a positive relationship also implies that a low degree of
TAG (i.e., tax compliance) is associated with a low degree of voluntary
disclosure, more in line with Lindblom’s (2010) scenarios 1 and 2. In a
government/society-as-a-whole perspective, this choice of CTB does not
need to be offset by positive environmental disclosures. It is still a
strategic decision based on cost-benefit analysis where input is per-
ceptions of (regulatory,) moral, cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy
risks in connection with the current situation, the objectives and im-
portance of stakeholder groups, culture and so on. In sum, the positive
relationship between TAG and voluntary environmental disclosure is in
line with trade-offs between the two elements of CSR.
Taken together, the support for hypotheses 1 and 2 suggests that
companies consider mandatory and voluntary actions differently in a
strategic perspective. Different motivations arise from regulatory legiti-
macy risks, which only exist for mandatory actions. Still, introduction of
regulations may also cause moral, cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy
risks to change over time (Fallan, 2016). Mandatory and voluntary en-
vironmental performance disclosures should be separated in such in-
vestigations; an aggregated, single measure of total disclosure dilutes the
relationship with TAG. This is illustrated by the insignificant variable
TOTDISC in this study. The need for separation of mandatory and vo-
luntary action/disclosure elements (characteristics within individual CSR
elements) extends the conclusion of Laguir et al. (2015) and Landry et al.
(2013) concerning separation of analysis between individual CSR ele-
ments. It is an important construct validity-contribution. A question for
future research is whether this also applies to other within-character-
istics, such as qualitative characteristics of disclosure/information.
A limitation of the study is that other CSR elements besides CTB and
environmental disclosure are not included. Such trade-offs are possible
or even likely to exist beyond these two elements. For example,
Lindblom’s (2010) fourth strategy would cause companies to use
whatever CSR element they are/perform good at, as long as it is of
importance to the relevant stakeholders at the time. Because the current
study does not control for other CSR elements and their potential
contemporaneous changes, the present results may be affected by such
contemporary trade-offs of other CSR elements. Still, for individual
industries and companies, relevant strategic CSR elements are often
easily observed, such as in the Norwegian fish-farming industry. And
even if investigation of strategic trade-offs may benefit from con-
sideration of several CSR elements simultaneously, the analysis has to
treat each element individually in line with Laguir et al. (2015) and
Landry et al. (2013). Importantly, the theory underpinning the in-
dicated difference between mandatory (no trade-offs) and voluntary
(trade-offs) actions revealed in this study should be equally relevant for
relationships between TAG and other CSR elements.
Other limitations include the possibility that our findings may be
driven by uncontrolled confounding factors, even though many firm
characteristics are controlled for in the regression model; the results
may be confined to disclosure and may not apply to other types of
performance (measures); the result may be due to the selection of
companies from OSE, even though exclusion of industries with differing
tax regimes such as oil and gas and shipping is common and necessary
in such studies; unlisted companies are not addressed; and that tax rules
differ among countries and time, and so may attention to CSR elements
and the accompanying direction and importance/strength of reg-
ulatory, moral, cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy risks (Gjølberg,
2009; Halme & Huse, 1997; Halme, Roome, & Dobers, 2009; Kuznetsov
et al., 2009). Hence, further research is needed to explore whether the
current findings are readily generalised or should be interpreted only in
light of local considerations and other context.
A different question that is not addressed in this paper is the
duration of potential strategic trade-offs. Even if they do occur, long-
itudinal studies are needed to consider whether stable relationships
exist between corporate behaviour on tax and CSR/environmental
disclosure over time, or if the diverging results in extant studies are
really just an indication of the opposite (and, hence, not caused by
missing, relevant mediating variables). Such considerations include
potential differences in the time horizons of strategic decisions of in-
dividual elements of CSR (including tax).
Nevertheless, the theoretical contribution of the current study, the
novel use of multidimensional legitimacy, allows for different contexts
(e.g., country, culture, and time). The direction and absolute and re-
lative strength of regulatory, moral, cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy
differs across such contexts. Hence, the theory may provide varying
predictions. Multidimensional use of legitimacy theory has a general
relevance in CSR (reporting) research.
26 Still, introduction of regulations may create cognitive dissonance, increase
risks and change actions (Adams & Whelan, 2009).
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9. Conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between corporate tax be-
haviour and mandatory and voluntary corporate environmental per-
formance disclosure, respectively. The results indicate that the cor-
porations with the highest compliance concerning mandatory
environmental reporting also have the highest tax compliance (lowest
tax aggressiveness), in line with regulatory legitimacy theory argu-
ments and a stick-to-the-rules strategy. No general trade-offs between
the two CSR elements are observed for mandatory actions. Meanwhile,
there are indications of trade-offs between corporate tax behaviour and
voluntary environmental disclosure. Corporations that have the most
comprehensive voluntary environmental reporting to meet the needs of
their stakeholders also undertake the most tax-aggressive behaviour to
please their shareholders.
Knowledge of strategic considerations and the use of trade-offs
improve understanding of corporate TAG/CSR behaviour (Dowling,
2014), including whether stick-to-the-rules or opportunistic strategies
dominate. The finding that regulation (and probably enforcement) af-
fects corporate strategic behaviour differently than voluntarism is im-
portant knowledge for governments that need to protect the tax base
and improve environmental performance disclosure. General well-in-
formed use of corporate disclosure also need to be aware of these dif-
ferences. The need for separation of mandatory and voluntary action/
disclosure (characteristics within individual CSR elements) extends the
conclusion of Laguir et al. (2015) and Landry et al. (2013) concerning
separation of analysis between individual CSR elements.
Corporate tax-aggressive behaviour involves management’s choices
among alternatives of tax planning, avoidance and evasion. Tax rev-
enues are important contributions to developing a democratic and
civilised society. Paying taxes is part of a social contract whereby pri-
vate and corporate citizens engage with the broader society to con-
tribute to maintaining infrastructure that underpins liberty and the
market economy (Christensen & Murphy, 2004). Still, CTB also affects
investor wealth more directly. This provides incentives for tax mini-
misation in all companies. For tax authorities, international operations
(partly outside their jurisdiction) may be especially challenging. Many
multinational corporations have been accused of TAG (2012, Preuss,
2010; Sikka, 2010; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). The possibility of shifting
profits from high-tax to low-tax countries creates tax management op-
portunities as well as legitimacy/reputational risks (Hardyment,
Truesdale, & Tuffrey, 2011). These companies face growing interest
from governments, concerned citizens and NGOs, such as the Trans-
parency International and Tax Justice Network, when they employ legal
but controversial means for reducing their tax payments.
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Similar to category 1, except that this involves impacts from products in a life-cycle perceptive. Implemented environmental co-labelling of
products is registered here.
3 No environmental impact “The company does not pollute the external environment.” / “The company has no environmental impact.”
4 Environmental policy Super-eminent objectives and strategies. A minimum requirement is that priority of the environmental focus is expressed or an intention to
follow an environmental program, e.g. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Environmental Program, the Charter of World
Business Council for Sustainable Development, UN’s Global Compact or a national environmental responsibility program. A statement saying
that the company has an environmental policy is not sufficient to be included in this category.
5 Environmental objectives Specific, measurable (and controllable) goals. For example, an objective to decrease the discharge level of a substance with a specified
amount within a defined time-period, certification according to an environmental programme or implementation of a reporting standard
within a specific time-frame.
6 Environmental authorities Contact with authorities. Environmental constraints, laws and regulations, incentives, discharge permits, disputes, etc.
7 Environmental events Specific events or accidents that have caused serious environmental impacts; e.g. excess of discharge permit or environmental disasters.
8 Environmental organization Information about how the company has organized their environmental work: e.g. responsibility, division of work, emergency preparedness
to meet environmental requirements and disasters, development of environmental expertise, implementation of or recertification according
to environmental management standards (e.g. ISO 14001, EMAS, Miljøfyrtårn) etc. Specific auditing is registered in category 9. Plans for
future implementation of environmental standards are registered in category 4.
9 Environmental audits Environmental auditing acts (internal and external), methodology, auditing standards, degree of assurance, reporting of auditing results and
the company’s follow-up work.
10 Audits of environmental dis-
closure
Information concerning audits of environmental disclosure. Otherwise similar to category 9.
11 Environmental investments Economic (monetary) information about completed investments to reduce the company’s environmental impacts, comply with discharge
permits etc. Reported (binding), planned investments belong to category 13 below.
12 Environmental costs / revenues Economic (monetary) information about the environmental costs and revenues of the year, e.g., fines and pollution abatement work.
13 Environmental liabilities Economic (monetary) information about liabilities, e.g., responsibility for future costs of disposal and clearing up after own or others
activities, future costs of other environment-related actions, cooperation, liabilities caused by money previously received for special
purposes, etc.
14 Clarification of environmental
concepts
Definition and clarification of environmental concepts etc.
15 Accounting (reporting) princi-
ples
The category concerns, e.g., accounting principles, accounting rules, procedures relating to measurement, valuation and disclosure of
environmental reporting issues.
16 Economic demand-side issues Non-monetary information on (expected future) market developments etc.
17 Economic supply-side issues Non-monetary information on economic issues, especially supply-side issues.
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Appendix B. NRS 16 The board of directors’ report
The natural environment […] Information about matters related to the business, including its input factors and products, which may have a not
insignificant impact on the natural environment must be disclosed. Disclosure must be provided on which environmental impacts the individual
aspects of the business give or can give, and what measures are in place or planned for implementation to prevent or reduce negative environmental
impacts.
In general, the following conditions may be important in terms of impact on the natural environment:
1) Type and quantity of energy and raw materials consumed
2) Type and quantity of contamination emitted, including noise, dust and vibration
3) Type and quantity of waste generated or owned, such as buried masses, open and closed landfills, deposits in watercourses or sea etc.
4) Accident risk of activities
5) Environmental impact associated with transportation
In addition, for companies that manufacture material products, the following conditions are important:
a) Type and quantity of health- and environmentally hazardous chemicals included in the products
b) Type and quantity of waste that occurs when the products are discarded
c) Environmental impact when using the products, including the necessary use of other products such as the use of petrol by cars
Whether conditions will have a not insignificant impact on the natural environment has to be assessed in terms of the individual business. Article
8 of the Pollution Control Act allows for common pollution from, among other things, homes, cottages and offices. Pollution covered by this
provision will usually represent an insignificant impact on the natural environment that does not require disclosure in the board of directors’ report.
Conversely, the manufacture of products containing pollutants/poisons/POPs can have a not insignificant influence on the natural environment.
Similarly, transport companies can emit gases that contribute to local air pollution, acidification or climate change and have a not insignificant
impact on the natural environment. […]
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